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ST~Et:I'

TH:i)

CF SENATOO MIKE HANSFIEID

mESIDO.."T 'S FCREIGN POLICY RE<RGANIZATION PLA!IS
July 311953.

On

August 1, President Eisenhower's reorganization plans for the conduct

of foreign affairs will go into effect.

Under Plan No. 7 an independent

Foreign Operations Administration will be created to house all the foreign aid
programs which are now administered separately b.y the Xutual Security Agency,
the State Department, and the Institute of Inter- American Affairs.

Under

Plan No , 8 a new United States Information Agency will absorb the overseas
information programs of the Department o:f State and MSA.
In sending these plans to Congress, the President has made clear that he
believes the consolidation of foreign aid programs in one independent agency
and the information programs in another \olill result in more efficient and mor e
economical

administration~

He bas also claimed that responsibility for foreign

policy below the presidential level will be more clearly assigned to the
Secretary of State after the two reorganizations.
I concur in the aiws that the President has in mind in proposing these
reorganizations.

~~imum

efficiency and economy are desirable ends in any

governmental undertaking and especially in one which consumes as large a portion
of our budget as our foreign operations do today.

And r esponsibility for con-

ducting the relations of the United States with other countries should be
centralized in the Secretary of State.

Too much is at stake to tolerate what

the President has described as "clouded" responsibility.
I do not concur , however, in the viev that these reorganization plans
represent the best way to obtain either

~~imuc

clear-cut responsibility for foreign policy.

efficiency and economy or
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I will not actively oppose the reorganization because as far as possible,
I vant President Eisenhower to have the kind of executive establishnent which
he feels is necesse.ry to carry out his program.
the plans vill eradicate

so~

I believe , furthermore , that

of the more obvi0us flavs in the present system.

I am compelled, however , to state my belief that the President ' s reorganization
does not go far enough.

It is , in my opinion, a half- way measure which gets

at the problems but stops short of solving them.
If Reorganization Plan No. 7 went one step further, if it placed the new

Foreign Operations Administration actually in the Department of State under a
Deputy Secretary or the equivalent then , I believe, the President might reach
the objectives which be seeks.
If Reorganization Plan No. 7 is examined point

br

point, it is clear that

the proposal goes half way 1 but only half way , to..sards correcting the major
defects in the present organization of foreign aid .
First , Mr • Eisenhower stated that in the recent past there has boen a
lack of clear assignment of centr al r esponsibility for foreign policy below
the presidential l evel.

He stated further that he was "taking the necessary

steps to confirm the hi stor ic r esponsibility of the Department of State as the
agency r esponsible under t he President for the development and contr ol of
foreign policy and all r elations wi th foreign gover nments. " Does he consider
that he has done this merely by issuing directives emphasizing that the Secretary
of State is r esponsible for advising and assisting him in the formulation and
control of foreign policy?
He has outlined the relationship which should exist between the Foreign
Operations Administration and the State Dcpartnent .

His instructions are

supposed to ensure that the Secretary of State will have adequate policy control
over foreign aid programs conducted by the Foreign Operations Administration.
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These instructions go half-way, but only half-way. They do indicate that
the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration will be somewhat more
responsive to the Secretary of State than -were the Directors for the Hutual
Security Agency and the Economic Cooperation Administration before him.

In

this regard, Reorganization Plan Noo 7 is an improvement. But the lines of
authority running from the Secretary of State to the Foreign Operations Administrator are still too tenuous, too vague to assure effective coordination between policy and operations. Reduced to fundamentals, the plan says in effect
we are going to have teamwork on foreign policy from these two teams because
we are going to have teamwork. This will -work if the Foreign Operations
Administrator recognizes the Secretary of State as the quarterback and if he
understands the signals that are being called.

If either decide to play by

themselves, or what is even more likely in the mystical language of bureaucracy,
the signals are not clearly understood, then we shall have the two teams stumbling
around the world,

Although the field is large, so too are these teams, and

sooner or later they will be stumbling over each other,
It seems to me that this whole problem could be eliminated by the simple
act of giving the State Department real, not theoretical, control of .the foreign
aid programs, by the simple act of moving
into Mr. Dulles household,

l~.

Stassen's household, so to speak;

Both might profit from this more intimate association.

The policy maker would become more conscious of the practical problems of turning
his objectives into operating realities.

And the policy operator would be

constantly reminded that, in the last analysis, without objectives there is little
point in operating.

If they were together t he Secretary of State and the Foreign

Operations Administrator

~ould

look out over the world situation from the same

wino0w. We could then have greater expectation that they would see relatively

- 4the sar.ce conditions a.'ld develop a relatively cor:.mon approach to them.
The second major deficiency

~hich

the President hopes to correct

tr~ough

Reorgllllization Plan No. 7 is the dispersion of foreign operational progra.n::::> throughout the executive branch.

Host of us agree that the lack of concentration of these

programs has resulted in waste end inefficiency.

Observer aft0.r observer 1 com-

mittee after committee has reported that there are too many American agencies
abroad , too many American employees , with a resultinB duplication
of personnel.

a.~d

overlapping

For instance, at the end of 1952 a Presidential mission headed by

the Secretary of Commerce reported:
There was an almost unanimous opinion that we have too many people
and too many agencies in Western Europe. \olhile we were most favorably
impressed with the high quality of many representatives of the United
States abroad , it would appear that their efficiency and morale are impaired by the fact that there are too many people doing too many things.
Confusion and wasted effort are the result. France , and in particular
Paris, may be taken as an exampleo There are at the moment four men each
with the title of "ambassador" in Paris. French government officials are
approached on the same problem by different individual s each claiming to
have or perhaps having authority to act. The situation is duplicated in
practically every other country of Western Europe.
From my own experience I am convinced that consolidation of these agencies
operating in the foreign field is absolutely necessary.

Last

Nov~ber

and December

as t he chairman of the Subconnnittee on Europe of the Foreien Affairs Committee, I
was part of a study mission to several countries of that continent.

We saw es-

sentially the same situation as reported on by the Presidential mission--too many
Americans, doing too many things , and in the process creating resentment and widespread confusion.

In Paris alone , there were four Anbassarlors and three l<inisters.

In eleven Western European countries there were four special ambassadors and

fifteen ministers in addition to the regul£.r diplolllE..tic beads of missions.
The study mission of the House Foreibn Affairs

Co~ittee

made

sever~l

recommendations which we felt would improve the organization of foreign
operations abroad"

At the country level we urged that the Ambassador, in
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addition to his diplonatic and consular activities be given full responsibil ity
for the information program, for foreign aid functions and possibly for coordination of Uo

s.

military activities. We urged that the final authority

of the regular Ambassador over all official American activity in the country
remain unchallenged by the presence of other Americans even though they might
have the rank ol.' ambassador or minister.

Only in this v1ay can the United

States have a single Dource of policy in each country.

And in this way, too ,

we can hope to conduct our overseas activities at much less cost and with much
more effectiveness than when numer ous ambassadors and ministers vie for posi tion.
For the regional level we recotmaended that the Office of the Special
Representative in Europe be abolished.

This office ho.d grown unwieldy and

had contributed to the confusion, bafflement , and frustration of Europeans
trying to go through proper channels .

In its place we recommended that

representation to the region be limited to a United States oission to the
North Atlantic Council with sufficient personnel in the economics field to
permit representation to regional economic organizations.
Some of the recommendations \.Jhich \.Je made last year will be carried
out by the President ' s reorganization plano For instance, the office of
the Special Representative in Europe is to be abolished.

That alone will

reduce confusion abroad , providing the pr oposed new mission to r egi onal
organizations is kept as small as possible.
The President has also taken steps to strengthen the position of our
regular Ambassadors , primarily by directir.e that 11The Chief of the United
States diplomatic mission in each forcicn country must provide effective
coordination of , and foreign policy direction with rerpect to , all TJnite<i
States Covernment activities in the country. "

- 6Reorganization Plan do. 7 has still other merits ,

It should eliminate

some waste and inefficiency by t!'le consolidation of t·1utual Security Administration , Technical Cooperation Administration and the Institute of Inter-Anorican
Aflairs.

A single organization instead of several will administer all the

major foreien assistance programs with the

excepti~n

of military aid .

If there

is now the will to abolish the adm!nistrative superstructures of these various
projects, there can be a savings in cost of operati0nso
Even this consolidation, h0wever, will not get at the major source
duplication and overlappingo

~f

That is to be fow1d in the activities of embassies

and the MSA missions , primarily in the economic , information, and administrative
areas .

Since independent agencies are being established for information programs

and for economic programs , and since each will have an administrative structure
separate from the Department of State , how can the r eorganization plan possibly
end overlapping in the three areas where it most widely exists , that is in information , economic affairs , and administration?
The only way that duplication in these major fields of overseas activity
can be eliminated is to center all of them in the Department of State,

This

was the recommendation of the House subcommittee which went to Europe last fall.
It was the recommendation of the two chief study groups sent by the Executive
Branch 1 0ne by the last administration and one by the present administration,
I would like to quote from conclusions of the former Secretary nf Commerce
concerning these problems in t he administration of f0reign aid .

Mr. Sawyer

stated:
Nor is the solution the creation of one new overall permanent department wh~se only assic~ent would be
to give away Uncle Sam's money or to handle purely foreign
economic affairso The creation of such a pernanent department would prove to be one of our roost expensive follies .
All matters which involve the relationship of the United
States with other com1tries should be handled by the existing

- 7 permanent departments and agencies of government.
The State Department should either specifically handle
or should coordinate all of our foreign political and
economic activities, with due allowance for practices
and activities authorized by law or long- standing
practice being carried on by other permenent agPncies.
For too long the State Department has suffered under
the hanaicap of trying to administer foreign policy with
its hands tied behind it .
The same decision was reached by the evaluation team of 54 business;oen sent
by Mutual Security Director Stassen this year to evaluate Mutual Scc;xrity

Programs in certain cotmtries" Their report , submitted in He.rch, stated
that "Regardless of the original necessity of establishing separate organizations, we believe that e.ctivities having to do with our foreign relationships
are a responsibility of the Department of State and si1ould now be operated

Beyond these valid analyses there is one overriding consideration arguing
for consolidation of foreign ec:momic programs within the State Department
rather than in an independent agency.

It is the compelling argument that in

the interests of the American people who have the financial burdens of overseas
operations and in the interests of our foreign policy objectives , we must begin
to lay the groundwork for the terminatiou of all massive foreign aid.
I do not believe that the creation of another new agency is preparation
for ending foreign aid or any part of it .
preparation for its perpetuationo

On the contrary, I believe it is

I would like to make clear that in opposing

the indefinite continuance of foreign aid I am not opposing at this time the
Mutual Security Program or any foreign aid proaram which contributes vitally
to the safety and welfare of our o'vm peopl e.
a large degree been responsible for

ste!~nin~

Economic aid in the past has to
the tide of Communism abroad

and for reviving faith in a democratic future in mc.ny parts of the world.
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Hilitary aid

h~s

served

friendly countries.
budget within

t.:f>

a cr.ta.lyst in building up defense forces in

This buildup has enabled us to keep our own rnili tary

msnaL~

proportions and has proved to be thus far a

deterrent to further Soviet q:gression ,
anJ~hing

Fordgn aid 1 perhaps more than

else, has provided vivid proof to

~he

world that this country is

capable of rising wisely and effectively to the demands of world leadership
in tiMe of peace .

But the demands of leadershjp also require us to knew

when to stop as well as when to start; wl!en to sense a chanee in a situPtion
that produces a change in the requir ements for

deali~g

It is not evidence of creative leadership but of the

with the situationo

a~ser.cs

nf it, if we

continue to work the same policy into the grow1d long after the time has come
to alter ito
As I have pointed out before, for eign aid is now approaching a point of
diminishing r eturns.

Its constr uctive results have been declining and it has

begun to pr oduce r esentment and impatience both in thi s country and broad.
negative effects are on the ver ge of out- weighing the positive.

The

We will &ccomplish

little by continuing to reiterate slogans which in past yeers kindled real
enthusiasw in Europe and in Amer ica but
accomplish littl e by driving the
willinely.

~hich

P~erican

now grate on the ear ,

We will

people to do what they once did

And we will accomplish little by encouraging the proud and r.ble

people o1' free countries abroad to remain depC;ndent on us year after yeur .
demands of leadership in this changing hour urge that the Uc

s.

The

take the initiative

and , together with other free nations , turn this one- way aid into two-way trade.
Hassive foreign assistance was desiructcd as a temporary , emergency measure;
it should never be allowed to become a per1aanent fixture of our foreign policy,
Nevertheless

Mr ~

Stassen, Director of the Hutual Sect:=ity Program, recently said

- 9that the aid proeram might have to continue for ten years , and according to
press reports , President Eisenhower has also indicated the same belief.

These

views are predicated on a continuance of the danger of communist aggression
for nt least that periodo
I cannot predict how long the Soviet threat will persist.
for decades .

It could endure

The fact that the totalitarian menance is likely to go on indef•

initely is all the more

reas~~

to develop

permanen~

solutions which will not

drain the .A!nerican econ..,my and which will not irritate both the giver and the
receiver by a prolonged one-sided dependence o
If we really must

co~. . . inue

foreign aid for a "·n::.le

~.vnger 1

then from the

point of view of eventual termination it would be much wiser to have it administered by existing agencies.

Anyone who is familiar with the workings of

government knows that the chances of foreign aid endang even after ten years
are remote i f in the meantime we have permitted an independent bureaucracy to
developo
If the program is administered by existing agencies , military aid could
be handled by the Defense Department and all other programs by the State
Department .

These t•:o agencies are permanent departments which can add a

function without necessarily adding a new administrative superstructure and
who can surrender a function without completely abolishing themselves e
Centralization of this kind would also be much more efficient. At the
present time military aid,

~hich

accounts for 80% of the Mutual Security funds ,

is already administered b,1 the Defense Department.

The Mutual Security Admini-

strator coordinates, directs , and supervises the aido

He in turn receives

"~e

have this middleman?

policy guidance from the Sscretary of State.

Hust

Would it net be more effective to have the Defense tepa.rtuent coordinate
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directly with the State Department rather than having to go through the Director
of the Foreign Operations Adcinistration?
Aid prograos other than military could best be operated directly within
the Department of State.
Foreign

Op~atione

As it i s proposed, the chief duties of the new

Administration will center on economic aid .

To continue to

bouse the remnants of the Harshall Plan in a large independent s.gency cun serve
only to encourage unnecessary continuance of

ec.onn~!c

aid.

In this interiru stage of winding up our fore::.{;'l aid programs , we must aim

at increasing the centraliza+.ion which I have been r'escribing.

Only in this

manner

boiled down to

<'a."l

essentials .

the admini str at:..;·e f:-r:t.h be r emoved Elnd the
Only in this way cer. we gradually

p:-~z:·ams

eliruj~ate ~gencics

which are

dependent on the con·(.inuation of foreign aid programs for their existence.
The programs can be terminated, one by one at the p:-oper

t~.me

in an orderly

mnnner \'ithout losing sight of the human element, w.!.':.hout causing hardship to
thousands of civil servants who have worked ably and faithfully in these socalled tempor ary agencies.
We should also aim in this inter im period at increas1.ng selectivity in the
distribution of foreign aid3

We should judge each program in each country on

its merit s in terms of our forei gn policy needs.

This year's mutual security

funds will be distributed among sixty countries.

In fact about the only

countries which will not be receiving aid in one form or another are those in
the Soviet bloc , a few of the British
Switzerland and Argentina.

common~ealth

nations , and Sweden, Ireland,

Are prograus necessary in 60 countries? We have

r eached the point where the discovery t hrt a nation is not r eceiving aid is front
page news.
Finally, during this interim period , tl!e grea-t; est cl'.allenbe to our leader-

- 11 ship and to the President and his administration who exercise the responsibilities
of that leadership is to work out a rational successor to present one-way aidprograms.

We cannot for very much longer preserve the cohesion of the non-

communist world with these programs.
an effective substitute.

Nor can we preserve that cohesion without

Unless this issue is met - and the proposed r eor gani-

zation does not equip us as effectively as it might to meet it - we will cast
away the solid gains in international stabil ity that have been made since the
great upheaval of World

IIo

\~ar

At the outset. I made

cle~r

that I would not oppose the Reorgani zation

Plans S'lb:nitted by the Pres.:-:le:ctc. But I want to
these plans contain many

pi'i:falls~

tta~<e

it E-.q ually clear that

I suspect that just as ue hc.ve

no~

seen an

end to proposals for foreign aid , neither have we seen an end to proposals for
administrative

reore~~izat~ons .

have before us the sequel

~o

Within a year or

t~o,

we shall probably

the present reorganize'.. ::.•m

p:i.a..~s ,

with the

Foreign Operations Administration and the Inte:...·national Information Administr ation headed back to the State Department.

We might have saved the huge costs

of still another reorganization if these programs had been put where they
belong now.

